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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
This Petition for Review by Appellant/Petitioner Scott L. Olsen is from
a final order of the Utah Labor Commission dated July 29, 2002. This
Court h a s jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
§§ 34A-2-801(8)(a), 63-46b-16, and 78-2a-3(2)(a) (1992).x

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issue 1; Did the Labor Commission properly conclude that a carrier may
deny a claim based upon legal causation even after initially accepting a
workers' compensation claim and paying benefits?
Standard: The doctrine of estoppel involves the agency's application
of general law. Therefore, the Court must review the Labor Commission's
conclusion for correctness, granting no deference to the agency's decision.
See Orton v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 864 P.2d 904 (Utah Ct. App. 1993);
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d) (1992).
Issue 2: Did the Labor Commission properly determine that the higher
standard of legal causation, announced in Allen v. Industrial Commission,

1

Appellees note that the substantive law to be applied in workers'
compensation cases is the law that existed at the time of the injury. In
this case, the alleged injury was in 1992, thus, 1992 law applies. In any
event, for purposes of this appeal, there is no substantial difference
between the current law and the law that existed in 1994.
-I-

729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986), applies here when the claimant conceded at the
hearing to having a pre-existing low back condition and presented no
evidence that any prior back condition was related to his employment with
the same employer?
Standard: Whether a court relies upon a proper legal standard
presents a question of law, reviewed for correctness. See McKesson Corp.
v. Labor Comm'n, 2002 UT App 10, If 10.
Issue 3: Did the Labor Commission properly determined that the act of
drilling one hole, in an overhead position with a four pound drill, through
metal of approximately 0.252 inches (.063 inches x 4 layers), did not meet
the higher standard of legal causation?
Standard: This involves the application of facts to the law where the
Labor Commission has a grant of discretion.

Reasonableness and

rationality standard applies. See A.E. Clevite v. Labor Common., 2000 UT
App 35, ff6-7; Acosta v. Labor Comm'n, 2002 UT App 67, f 11 (mixed
question of law and fact reviewed for reasonableness and rationality).
DETERMINATIVE LAW
The relevant statute at issue is Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401 (1992), 2
of the Utah Worker's Compensation Act. This section provides:
2

This statute was previously codified as section 35-1-45, U.C.A.
-2-

(1) An employee . . . who is injured
by accident arising
out of and in the course of the employee's
employment,
wherever such injury occurred, if the accident was not
purposefully self-inflicted, shall be paid . . . compensation for
loss sustained on account of the injury . . . the amount
provided for in this chapter for . . . medical, nurse, and hospital
services and medicines, . . . provided for under this chapter.
(2) The responsibility for compensation and payment of
medical, nursing, and hospital services and medicines . . . shall
be . . . on the employer and the employer's insurance carrier.
Id. (Emphasis added). The section emphasized above was interpreted by
the Utah Supreme Court in Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15,
18, 22-23 (Utah 1986) to require an applicant to prove both medical and
legal causation. Particularly, "where a claimant suffers from a preexisting
condition which contributes to the injury, an u n u s u a l or extraordinary
exertion is required to prove legal causation. Where there is no preexisting
condition, a usual or ordinary exertion is sufficient." IdL at 26.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves the interpretation and application of Utah's
Workers' Compensation Act (the "Act"); specifically, Utah Code Ann. § 34A2-401 and case law interpreting this Act. Respondent Boeing Company, by
and

through

its workers' compensation

carrier,

Freemont

Comp

(collectively, the "Respondents"), voluntarily paid workers' compensation
indemnity and medical payments to Mr. Olsen for a back injury he claims
-3-

occurred on February 26, 1992 when he was drilling a hole in an aircraft
fuselage for Boeing.

After further investigation, Respondents denied

Petitioner's claim based upon lack of legal causation.
Mr. Olsen filed his Application for Hearing alleging that he herniated
a low back disc while "drilling multiple holes overhead with moderate to
heavy force" on February 26, 1992. A formal hearing on the application
was held on J a n u a r y 17, 2002 before Administrative Law Judge Stuart
Poelman (the "ALJ") at the Utah Labor Commission.

On J a n u a r y 3 1 ,

2002, the ALJ entered his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order,
denying workers' compensation benefits (the "ALJ's Order"). See R., 62-65.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Review with the Labor Commission (the
"Commission") on February 27, 2002. See R., 69-77. Respondents filed
their Response to Motion for Review on March 8, 2002. See R., 86-95. On
July 29, 2002 the Commission issued its Order Denying Motion for Review,
affirming the ALJ's denial of workers' compensation benefits to Mr. Olsen
(the "Commission's Order"). See R., 97-101.
Mr. Olsen filed a Petition for Review with this court on August 2 1 ,
2002 seeking review from the final order of the Labor Commission. See R.,
102-04. A Docketing Statement was filed on October 9, 2002.

-4-

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mr. Scott Olsen was a production associate who was working for
Boeing Company on February 26, 1992. The evidence presented at the
hearing showed that on February 26, 1992, Petitioner injured himself
sometime between 9:00 and 10:00 a.m. while performing his regular
assignment of drilling holes through the skin of an airplane fuselage. See
R., 106 at 2 1 .
In the hour preceding the injury, he testified that he drilled about
twenty holes, more or less.

See id. At the time of the injury, Petitioner

was drilling a . 1285 diameter hole with a four pound drill.

See id. The

drill bit had been used oiI no more than four to eight holes prior to drilling
the hole during which he felt a sudden onset of pain.
was drilling the hole through four layers of metal.
a .063 inches thick piece of hardened steel.

See id. at 28. He

See id. One layer was

See id. at 24. The other

three layers were .063 inches thick pieces of aluminum.

See id. at 24.

He drilled the hole overhead about six inches from the top of his head and
slightly in front of his face.

See id. at 22. While drilling a specific hole

he felt a "pop* in his low back with the sudden onset of low back pain.
See id. at 27. He immediately stopped work and eventually received low

-5-

back surgery at the same level of his spine that had been surgically treated
in 1989. See id. at 12.
During the hearing, Petitioner acknowledged that he had

a

pre-existing low back condition which was aggravated on February 26,
1992. See ALJ's Order at 3; See id. at 12-13.

Petitioner conceded that

his preexisting back condition occurred sometime in 1989, which
ultimately resulted in a low back surgery at L4-5 on or around August 15,
1989. See ALJ's Order at 3. At that time, Mr. Olsen was employed by
Boeing's predecessor, McDonald Douglas.
Petitioner testified that in the few months preceding his 1989
surgery, he gradually developed low back pain.

See R. 106 at 12-13. He

did not associate the onset of this pain with any work/home

event or activity.

See id. At no time during the hearing did Petitioner assert that his 1989
injury occurred in the scope of his employment with McDonald Douglas,
or that the 1989 injury was an accepted industrial claim.

Indeed, no

workers compensation claim was every made by Petitioner or paid by
anyone for the 1989 "accident."
The threshold issue before the ALJ was whether the February 26,
1992 accident satisfied the higher legal causation standard articulated in

-6-

Allen v. Industrial Commission.

See R., 105 at 6. At the hearing the

parties testified as follows:
[Attorney Chai]: The principal issue is whether Mr. Olsen's February
26, 1992 incident meets the higher legal causation
standard in Allen. It would be our position that it
does not and I think that will become obvious as we
go through the evidence today. . . .
[Petitioner]:

I think the main thing right now in question is the
part of higher causation. Industrial Indemnity at
first, which is pre-Fremont, was aware of my preexisting condition from an earlier surgery that they
were aware of that. But when it comes to the
higher causation from the accident on February 26,
1992, the only real way I can do it is explain to you
the job duties and the job activities that I was doing
at the time. . . .

[ALJ]:

What we really need is to know what problems you
were having prior to your accident on February 26.

[Petitioner]:

Ok, my first surgery was in 1989. I'm not quite
sure of the date and month. I really could not pinpoint that to anything specific that happened.
The pain gradually came on over the course of a
few months until the pain got unbearable until I
had surgery. . . .

[Petitioner]:

I think my proving the higher causation is the main
concern here. I hope I proved the higher causation.

See R., 105 at 6, 12, 17 (Emphasis added).
At the hearing Respondents called Dr. E. Paul France as a qualified
biomechanical engineer and biomedical expert witness. See id. at 3 1 . He
explained the biomechanical dynamics involved in the use of the low back.
-7-

He explained that several variables come into play when determining the
compressive forces on the low back. These include the force or weight of
the external object operating on the spine, the weight of the person's upper
body, the distance of the force or weight from the body, and the angle of
the back from perpendicular to the ground. See id. at 32. As any of these
factors increases, the compressive force on the low back increases. As the
angle of the back and the distance from the body increase, the person's
upper body weight and the impact of the musculature pulling on the spine
increases. Thus an insignificant force or weight can have a very significant
impact on the compressive forces on the low back when the back's angle
from perpendicular is great. See id.
Dr. France reported that he conducted an experiment to determine
the compressive forces that were involved in Mr. Olsen's February 26, 1992
drilling incident. This involved having an assistant use both a new and a
well used drill bit of the same diameter used by Petitioner on February 26,
1992.

The assistant stood on a scale and drilled through steel and

aluminum layers in a manner replicating that described by Petitioner. In
this manner Dr. France determined a range for the force involved in drilling
the hole. He reported that the holes he drilled were done at the rate of
sixty per hour which was three times the rate at which Petitioner drilled
holes. Using the biomechanical models used by O.S.H.A. and N.I.O.S.H.,
-8-

he calculated the compressive force on the Mr. Olsen's back at the time of
the February 26, 1992 injury. He concluded that the compressive

forces

were well below the levels considered damaging to the low back by O.S.H.A.
and N.LO.S.H.
forces

used

See id. at 45. He further observed that the

in drilling the hole described

compressive

by Petitioner were

roughly

equivalent to Petitioner bending forward at the waist to pick up a paper clip
or penny from off the ground. See id. at 46. As explained by Dr. France,
the facts that the drilling was done with the back nearly erect and with the
drill close to his body minimized the compressive force on the low back.
On J a n u a r y 3 1 , 2002, the ALJ entered his Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order. See R., at 62-67. Judge Poelman ruled
that the drilling event of February 26, 1992 did not meet the higher legal
causation standard required to find compensability for the aggravation of
a pre-existing low back condition. The ALJ's Order provides:
Petitioner was unable to demonstrate that the activity of drilling
holes in which he was engaged on February 26, 1992 resulted
in an exertion on his low back which was unusual or
extraordinary when compared to activities and exertions typical
of those experienced by men and women in their nonemployment lives.
Id. at 64-65. Since Mr. Olsen did not meet his burden, the ALJ ruled that
Petitioner's accident was not compensable under Utah law and, ultimately,
denied workers compensation benefits.
-9-

On February 27, 2002, Mr. Olsen filed a Motion for Review asserting
entitlement to workers' compensation benefits. See R., 69-85. He asserted
that (1) the Respondents'voluntary payment of benefits estops them from
now asserting a legal causation defense; (2) the lower standard of legal
causation applies here since the claimant's prior back condition occurred
while working for Boeing's predecessor; and, (3) the claim here involves a
cumulative stress which meets the higher legal causation standard. On
March 8, 2002 Respondents filed a Response to Motion for Review refuting
these claims.
On July 29, 2002 the Labor Commission issued its Order Denying
Motion for Review. See R., 97-101. The Commission ruled as follows:
3.

The Respondents payment of benefits did not foreclose their
right to later contest liability;

4.

Mr. Olsen's claim is subject to the higher legal causation
standard since the claimant conceded that he had a prior back
condition at the same level and because this conclusion was
supported by the medical evidence of Dr. Smith - who opined
that 25% of the claimant's 1992 injury was due to a preexisting condition;

5.

Mr. Olsen's argument that the lower legal standard of causation
standard did not apply based upon the fact that the claimant
worked for Boeing in 1989. The court ruled that the claimant
failed to put on evidence to support that the 1989 injury was
related to this employment;

6.

A cumulative trauma theory does not apply since the claimant
testified his injury came upon suddenly, rather than as a result
of cumulative exertions on the date of injury; and,
-10-

7.

Mr. Olsen's act of drilling one hole in the aircraft fuselage does
not meet the higher standard of legal causation.

Mr. Olsen subsequently filed this petition for judicial review.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
First, the Commission correctly ruled that a carrier's voluntary
payment of workers' compensation benefits does not foreclose a carrier's
right to later contest liability.
Second, the Commission properly concluded that the higher legal
causation standard articulated in Allen applies in this case.
Third, the Commission acted reasonably and rationally in determining
that not only did the cumulative trauma theory not apply, but also that the
one time act of drilling a hole on February 26, 1992, as testified to by
Petitioner at the evidentiary hearing, did not meet this higher standard.

-11-

ARGUMENT
POINT I
A CARRIER'S ACCEPTANCE OF A WORKERS' COMPENSATION
CLAIM DOES NOT FORECLOSE ITS RIGHT TO LATER DENY THE
CLAIM BASED UPON A LEGAL CAUSATION DEFENSE

Petitioner argues that the Respondents cannot voluntarily pay
benefits and then deny the claim for lack of legal causation. He cites Olsen
v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 776 P.2d 937 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) and
Harding v. Industrial Commission, 28 P.2d 182 (Utah 1934) in support of
his position. Unfortunately, Mr. Olsen's argument lacks legal merit under
Utah law.
In Olsen v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 776 P.2d 937 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989), the court addressed this precise issue. In Olsen, the injured
worker claimed that because the carrier paid benefits for the industrial
injury, and then later denied liability, the carrier was estopped from
challenging liability. The Court of Appeals disagreed. See id. There, the
Court stated that "the mere fact that an employer pays benefits initially
without contesting liability does not mean that it is thereafter, as a matter
of law, barred from contesting liability." Id. The Court proceeded to state:
It would be unjust to both the employee and the insurance
carrier if the law were that when the insurance carrier once
undertakes to provide medical or other care for an injured
[employee] it h a s lost all right to afterwards defend against
what it believes to be an unjust or illegal claim. The insurance
-12-

carrier cannot and ought not wait until full investigation h a s
been made before providing necessary care and treatment for
injured [employees].
Id., see also 4 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 82.61 at 15-1215
to 15-1224 (1989) (voluntary payment does not constitute an "award" for
which proceedings may be reopened not does it waive the employer's right
to later dispute the claim).
Likewise, in Harding v. Industrial Commission, 28 P.2d 182 (Utah
1934), the Utah Supreme Court wrote:
Ordinarily, in the absence of prejudice to the employee or of
facts giving rise to estoppel, an insurance carrier may,
notwithstanding voluntary payment of compensation, the
furnishing of hospital or medical care, the entry of appearance,
or statement made that the policy covered the employee, urge
the defense that the employee did not meet with an accident,...
or that there was no causal connection between the injury and
disability.
Id.

Petitioner's reliance on Harding and Olsen for his position is simply

inaccurate. Moreover, as the Commission correctly ruled, because Mr.
Olsen did not allege facts that would estop Respondents from denying
liability for the industrial accident, Petitioner's argument lacks substantive
merit. Therefore, we ask this Court to affirm the Commission's conclusion
on this matter.

-13-

POINT II
THE COMMISSION PROPERLY RULED THAT THE HIGHER
LEGAL CAUSATION STANDARD APPLIED AND THAT PETITIONER'S
WORK EVENT OF FEBRUARY 26, 1992 DID NOT MEET THIS
HIGHER STANDARD
A.

Petitioner's Industrial Injury Is Subject to Evaluation Under
Allen's Higher Legal Causation Standard

Petitioner initially submits that the Commission erred in applying
Allen's higher legal causation standard in this case. He submits that the
lower legal causation standard instead applies. Respondents disagree.
Under the Utah Worker's Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann. § 34A2-401 (1992), an employee is entitled to worker's compensation benefits for
injuries occurring "by accident arising out of and in the course of the
employee's employment." IcL To receive benefits, a claimant must, among
other things, prove by a preponderance of evidence a causal connection
between the injury and the activities or exertions in the work place. See
Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15, 18, 22-23 (Utah 1986). To do
so, the claimant m u s t prove both "legal causation" and "medical
causation". See id. at 25. In Allen, the threshold case on this matter, the
Court stated:
Where a claimant suffers from a preexisting condition which
contributes to the injury, an u n u s u a l or extraordinary exertion

-14-

is required to prove legal causation. [3] Where there is no
preexisting condition, usual or ordinary exertion is sufficient. [4]
Allen. 729 P.2d at 26 (bracketed material added).
The Commission correctly concluded that the higher legal causation
standard applies here based upon the fact that Petitioner had a preexisting low back injury, at the same level as his 1992 injury.

The

Commission stated:
Mr. Olsen concedes he suffered an early injury to his low back
several years prior to the work-related incident of February
1992. He also appears to concede that the earlier back injury
contributed to the subsequent injury of February 1992. That
conclusion is supported by Dr. Smith's statement that 25% of
Mr. Olsen's 1992 injury was due to a pre-existing condition.
See R., at 99.
Petitioner maintains that the Commission erred in applying the
higher legal causation standard because his preexisting condition was
caused by work-related injuries caused while working at Boeing/McDonald
Douglas. He also submits that the Commission's order is reversible due to
its failure to make subsidiary findings regarding whether the earlier back
injury "contributed" to his subsequent industrial injury. These points are
addressed in turn below.

3

This is known as the higher standard of legal causation.

4

This is known as the lower standard of legal causation.
-15-

(1)

Petitioner Has Waived His Right to Raise the Issue That
Allen's Lower Legal Causation Standard Applies

Petitioner argues that Allen's lower standard of legal causation
applies under the strictures of Fred Meyer v. Industrial Commission, 800
P.2d 282 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) and its progeny since he believes his first
back injury occurred at McDonald Douglas in 1989 and his February 26,
1992 back injury occurred while working for Boeing, its successor.

In

other words, he argues that the lower legal causation standard applies
because he was essentially working for the "same employer" when he
sustained each of his back injuries.
While it is well-settled in Utah that workers' compensation claimants
are not required to satisfy the higher standard to establish legal causation
if the pre-existing condition resulted from an accident occurring during
employment with the same employer, including a predecessor, see Fred
Meyer, supra, it is also well settled in Utah that issues that are not raised
before the trial court are waived on appeal. See Holstrom v. C.R. England,
2000 UT App 239, Tf26. In Holstrom, the court stated:
It is axiomatic that, before a party may advance an issue on
appeal, the record must clearly show that it was timely
presented to the trial court in a manner sufficient to obtain a
ruling thereon. Salt Lake County v. Carlston, 776 P.2d 653,
655 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); see also Hart v. Salt Lake County
Comm'n, 945 P.2d 125, 129 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (A matter is
sufficiently raised if it is submitted to the trial court, and
the court is afforded an opportunity to rule on the issue.).
-16-

Moreover, the party must specifically raise the issue, such
that it is brought to "level of consciousness" before the
trial court. This requirement serves the interests of judicial
economy and orderly procedure by not only giving the trial
court a chance to correct error, but by making the parties
crystallize issues prior to appeal. When issues are not
brought to the trial court's attention in a timely manner,
they are deemed waived, precluding this court from
considering their merits on appeal.
Id. (Emphasis added) (Some citations omitted). Similarly, in Hilton Hotel
& Pac. Rel. v. Industrial Commission, 897 P.2d 352 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)
the court stated:
it is error to adjudicate issues not raised before or during
trial and unsupported by the record. The trial court is not
privileged to determine matters outside the issues of the case,
and if he [or she] does, his [or her] findings will have no force
or effect. In law or in equity, a judgment must be responsive to
the issues framed by the pleadings, and a trial court has no
authority to render a decision on issues not presented for
determination. Any findings rendered outside the issues are
a nullity. . . .
Raising an issue not addressed by the parties is
inappropriate and outside of the discretion given t h e
governing tribunal because it encroaches upon the advocate
responsibility conferred upon counsel. Furthermore, if a
party fails to raise an issue and present evidence regarding
the same, it has waived the right to do so. Thus, the
interests of justice are not enhanced when the court exceeds its
role as arbiter by reaching out and deciding an issue that
would otherwise be dead, it not having been litigated at the
time of trial.
Id. (Emphasis added) (Citations omitted).

-17-

In this case, the issue of whether Allen's lower standard of legal
causation should apply—because the claimant injured his back while
essentially working for the same employer — was not an issue submitted
for consideration by the Administrative Law Judge. Indeed, Petitioner did
not sufficiently raise this issue before or at the hearing on this matter. The
threshold issue addressed at the hearing was whether the claimant's work
activities on February 26, 1992 met Allen's higher legal causation
standard.
Given Petitioner's failure to timely raise this issue before the ALJ at
the hearing on this matter, he h a s waived his right to now raise this issue
on appeal. The fact that the claimant is now represented by legal counsel
does not change the fact that he has forfeited his right to assert this
argument.
(2)

Petitioner Failed to Submit Evidence that his Pre-existing
Condition was Caused by A Prior Injury at McDonald
Douglas.

The Petitioner's argument—that the "same employer" criterion applies
to trigger the lower legal causation standard—also fails on the substantive
merits. The Commission correctly ruled that Petitioner failed to submit any
evidence to support his claim that the 1989 back injury occurred in the
course and scope of his employment with McDonald Douglas, or that the
1989 injury was an accepted industrial claim. See Commission's Order at
-18-

3.

As noted, no worker's compensation claim was ever filed by the

Petitioner or paid by anyone for the 1989 "accident*.

As

the

ALJ

correctly pointed out in his Order:
[petitioner testified that in 1989 he underwent a lumbar back
surgery in the form of a discectomy for his back problems, the
cause of which is unknown. . . Petitioner concedes that he
had a pre-existing low back condition which had required
surgery prior to his claimed industrial accident. It is clear
that the injury which he suffered as a result of his work
activities on February 26, 1992 constituted an aggravation of
his pre-existing low back condition.
ALJ's Order at 2-3 (Emphasis added).
In any event, Mr. Olsen fails to appropriately meet his marshaling
duty on this factual finding. It is well-settled that a challenging party has
the burden to list all of the evidence in support of the Commission's factual
finding—that his preexisting condition was not caused by prior injuries at
McDonald Douglas—and then show the fatal flaw in the Commission's
determination. See West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311,
1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). He h a s not done so here. For this reason
alone, this Court should reject Mr. Olsen's argument.
(3)

The Commission Did Not Commit Reversible Error in
Determining that the Higher Legal Causation Standard
Applied.

Petitioner further submits that the Commission's Order is reversible
since the Commission did not make any subsidiary findings regarding the
-19-

contribution of the pre-existing low back condition to the 1992 industrial
injury. On this point, the Court stated in Allen:
Where a claimant suffers from a preexisting condition which
contributes to the injury, an unusual or extraordinary exertion
is required to prove legal causation. Where there is no
preexisting condition, usual or ordinary exertion is sufficient.
Allen, 729 P.2d at 26 (emphasis added).
The fact that a claimant has any preexisting condition does not
trigger the higher legal causation standard under Utah law. "An employer
m u s t prove medically that the claimant 'suffers from a preexisting
condition which contributes to the injury."' This means that the preexisting
condition must be "relevant to the work injury/' See Nyrehn v. Industrial
Common. 800 P.2d 330 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). In Nyrehn. the Court held
that the failure of the Labor Commission to make a factual finding on
whether the preexisting condition was "contributory" is generally reversible
error (since this is material issue and renders the findings arbitrary and
capricious) unless the evidence
of only one conclusion.

is clear, uncontroverted

and

capable

IcL (holding Commission's error in failing to make

factual finding was harmless since employee's work exertion satisfies the
higher legal causation standard).
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Petitioner incorrectly asserts that the A U did not make any finding
on the contributory nature of the claimant's pre-existing back condition.
Indeed, the ALJ stated in his Order,
[petitioner testified that in 1989 he underwent a lumbar back
surgery in the form of a discectomy for his back problems, the
cause of which is unknown. . . Petitioner concedes that he
had a pre-existing low back condition which had required
surgery prior to his claimed industrial accident. It is clear
that the injury which he suffered as a result of his work
activities on February 26, 1992 constituted an aggravation
of his pre-existing low back condition.

ALJ's Order at 2-3 (Emphasis added). Likewise, the Commission also
addressed the contributory nature of pre-existing condition:
On August 15, 1989, Mr. Olsen underwent lumbar discectomy
at the L 4 / 5 level of his spine. At that time, Mr. Olsen was
employed by Boeing's predecessor, McDonald Douglas. Mr.
Olsen does not attribute the need for surgery in 1989 to any
employment-related accident or injury. . . .
According to Dr. Smith, Mr. Olsen ? s treating physician, 25% of
Mr. Olsen's 1992 injury was due to pre-existing conditions.
SeeR., 97-98.
Even if one assumes that either of the orders' language is legally
insufficient or vague, the medical evidence presented by Respondents at
the hearing doubtlessly showed that Mr. Olsen had a pre-existing injury at
the same lumbar level. See R., 105 at 137. As noted, Mr. Olsen also
conceded that the higher legal standard applies. SeeR., 105 at 6, 12, 17.
-21-

In any event, the evaluation of this issue by this Court is barred since Mr.
Olsen failed to raise the issue of contribution to the level of the ALJ's
consciousness. See Smallwood v. Bd. of Rev, of Ind. Common, 841 P.2d
716 (UtahCt. App. 1992).
B.

The Activities of February 2 6 , 1992 Do Not Rise to the
Level of Unusual or Extraordinary Exertion under the Allen
Higher Legal Causation Test

Assuming that the Commission correctly concluded that the higher
legal causation standard applies here, this Court must next evaluate
whether the Commission acted reasonably and rationally in ruling that the
activities of February 26, 1992 did not rise to the level of an u n u s u a l or
extraordinary exertion.
Mr. Olsen submits that the cumulative stress or exertion levels
required on the morning of February 26, 1992 collectively meet Allen's
higher legal causation standard. Again, Respondents agree with the ALJ
and the Commission — that the claimant's drilling activities on the claimed
date of injury, as testified by Petitioner, do not meet the higher legal
causation standard.
In Allen, the Court stated:
To meet the legal causation requirement, a claimant with a
preexisting condition must show that the employment
contributed something substantial to increase the risk [he]
already faced in everyday life because of [his] condition. This
additional element of risk in the workplace is usually supplied
-22-

by an exertion greater than that taken in normal, everyday
[nonemployment] life of [any person]. . . . Thus, where the
claimant suffers from a preexisting condition which contributes
to the injury, an unusual or extraordinary
exertion is
required to prove legal causation. In evaluating typical
nonemployment activity, the focus is on what typical
nonemployment activities are generally expected in today's
society, not what the [injured] . . . claimant is accustomed to
doing. Typical activities and exertions expected of men and
women in the latter part of the 20th century, for example,
include taking full garbage cans to the street, lifting and
carrying baggage for travel, changing a flat tire on an
automobile, lifting a small child to chest height, and climbing
the stairs in buildings.
Id. at 26 (emphasis added). The Court further addressed legal causation
in the context of repetitive motion injuries in Nyrehn v. Industrial
Commission. 880 P.2d 330 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 5
5

In Nyrehn, the Court stated:

The Utah Supreme Court has broadly defined "accident"
to include injuries which are the result of repetitive
exertion.
[An accident] connotes an unanticipated, unintended
occurrence different from what would normally be expected
to occur in the usual course of events.... This is not
necessarily restricted to some single incident which
happened suddenly at one particular time and does not
preclude the possibility that due to exertion, stress or other
repetitive cause, a climax might be reached in such a
manner as to properly fall within the definition of an accident
as just stated above.
When an accident is the climax of repeated exertions, as
in Nyrehns case, work-related "exertion," for purposes of
proving legal causation, is the aggregate exertion of the
-23-

repetitive exertions that establish the accident. See Miera
v. Indus. Comm'n. 728 P.2d 1023, 1024 (Utah 1986)
(claimant's repetitive "jumps into an eight-foot hole [by way
of] a four-foot platform at thirty-minute intervals constitute a
considerably greater exertion than that encountered in
non-employment life"). In other words, we must consider
the whole burden on the camel and not just the straw
that breaks the camel's back. See Smith 8s Edwards, 770
P.2d at 1018 (must consider all factors related to exertion);
Workers Compensation Fund, 761 P.2d at 575 (comparing
cumulative effect of several factors, including driver's fatigue,
anxiety, and the stress of driving through a snow storm, with
the exertion of nonemployment life).
In Allen, the supreme court listed the following examples of
typical nonemployment activities: "taking full garbage cans to
the street, lifting and carrying baggage for travel, changing a
flat tire on an automobile, lifting a small child to chest
height, and climbing the stairs in buildings/' Allen, 729 P.2d
at 26. While lifting a tub of merchandise weighing between
15 and 40 pounds once or twice could likewise fit into the list
of examples above, lifting such a tub 30 to 36 times a day for
two and a half months is not a typical nonemployment
activity. The foregoing moderately strenuous activities which
may not be considered u n u s u a l when performed once or
twice may nevertheless amount to unusual exertion when
performed repeatedly. Otherwise, garbage collectors, baggage
handlers, auto mechanics, childcare providers, etc., would be
barred by the foregoing examples.
In the case before u s it is unquestionable that two and a
half months of lifting tubs of merchandise 30 to 36
times a day would cause u n u s u a l and extraordinary wear
and tear on a body when compared with the "usual wear and
tear and exertions of nonemployment life." Allen, 729 P.2d at
26. The test is not whether the type of exertion which
caused the injury is unknown in nonemployment life, but
rather whether the cumulative work-related exertion
exceeds the normal level of exertion in nonemployment
-24-

The Commission correctly noted that the application of the Allen
higher legal causation standard first requires the court to identify what
actual work activity gives rise to the claim.

See R., 99. In this case,

Petitioner's claim alleges only one specific date of injury. See R., 1. He
alleged that on February 26, 1992 he sustained an injury from "drilling
multiple holes overhead".

However, the Commission relied upon

Petitioner's actual hearing testimony in determining that the only activity
that may be considered for purposes of meeting the legal causation test is
his activity of drilling one hole on February 26, 1992. In other words, the
Commission ruled that Petitioner's cumulative stress theory—based upon
repetitive motions of drilling throughout the morning of February 26, 1992
(or during the course of his employment with McDonald Douglas/Boeing,
which he does not assert in this appeal)-was unsupported by his
testimony. 6

life. We doubt that there are many physical activities outside
of the workplace where this type of effort is being repeated so
often over such a significant period of time.
Id,
6

The Commission ruled as follows:

Mr. Olsen testified at the evidentiary hearing that the 1992
-25-

Based upon the evidence submitted,

the Commission

acted

reasonably and rationally in ruling that Petitioner's work activity of drilling
one hole on February 26, 1992 did not meet Allen's higher legal causation
standard.

The Commission correctly relied upon the testimony of Dr.

France who opined that compressive force on Petitioner's low back was no
greater than had Petitioner reached forward to pick u p a paper clip or a
penny from off the floor, an activity which involves normal, nonemployment exertions. The ALJ and Commission accurately relied upon

injury came on suddenly with a sharp, immediate pain.
There is no contrary evidence that the injury came on
gradually or resulted from Mr. Olsen's cumulative exertions
that morning. The Commission therefore concludes it is Mr.
Olsen's discrete activity of drilling a particular
hole in
the aircraft fuselage that must satisfy the more
stringent prong of the Allen test for legal
causation.
The Commission views the direct force Mr. Olsen experienced
from operating a light-weight drill in an overhead position a s
substantially similar to the exertion required by various
home improvement projects, placing items in overhead
cabinets or shelves, or other similar activities.
Furthermore, the bio-medical evidence presented by Dr.
France establishes that the mechanical forces involved in Mr.
Olsen's work exertions produced low-back stress no greater
than that experienced by simply bending over to pick up a
light-weight object such as a coin. Consequently, Mr. Olsen's
exertions at work on February 26, 1992, were not u n u s u a l or
extraordinary when compared to the typical, exertions of
nonemployment life. For that reason, the Commission
concludes, as did the ALJ, that Mr. Olsen h a s failed to
establish legal causation.
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Dr. France's testimony that the drilling activities of February 26, 1992 did
not involve compressive forces on the low back that even reached those
levels that O.S.H.A. and N.I.O.S.H. consider relevant to the population in
general.
Given that the claimant's actual work activities on February 26, 1992
involved drilling 20 to 30 holes in an overhead position with a four pound
drill through metal of approximately 0.252 inches (.063 x 4 layers), and his
injury occurred when drilling one of these multiple holes, Mr. Olsen has
not met his burden of showing that his work activities on this date involved
u n u s u a l or extraordinary exertion.
CONCLUSION
Respondents ask this Court to affirm the Commission's Order
Denying Motion for Review. The Commission ruled correctly in all
issues it was asked to review.
DATED this ifr^ day of February, 2003.
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